China’s quantum satellite can be hacked, but the claim still needs to be verified
The world’s first quantum satellite, China’s Micius, can be hacked after all. Or so this Russian researcher says.
University of Science and Technology of China
The world’s first quantum satellite, China’s Micius, can be hacked after all. Or so this Russian researcher says.
- Micius is the world’s first quantum satellite, sent to space in 2016.
- It is key to the QUESS mission, which is designed to accelerate the development of quantum encryption and quantum teleportation technology.
- Theoretically, information protected by quantum physics-based cryptography is considered to be unhackable.
- A Singapore-based researcher claims the satellite is susceptible to hacking after all. The claim has yet to be verified.
According to Hong Kong-based media outlet SCMP, Micius (or Mozi) isn’t safe from hacking after all.
Micius is the world’s first quantum satellite, sent to space in 2016. It is of key importance to the QUESS (Quantum Experiments at Space Scale) – joint Chinese-Austrian satellite mission.
The mission is designed to accelerate the development of quantum encryption and quantum teleportation technology. One key objective is to implement a long-distance quantum communication network based on high-speed QKD (Quantum Key Distribution) between the satellite and ground station.
Theoretically, information protected by quantum physics-based cryptography is considered to be unhackable.
However, Alexander Miller, a quantum researcher, now says it can be potentially hacked due to small delays between the satellite’s onboard lasers.
Miller, as SCMP emphasizes, is a former Russia-based quantum researcher who’s now working from Singapore. The paper the article is based on was published in a non-peer-reviewed journal. Unfortunately, the media outlet mentioned neither the name of the paper nor linked to the original research.
A quick open-source search revealed Miller has, in fact, stated that Micius was hackable this March because of the decoy-state BB84 protocol for quantum key distribution (QKD) used on the satellite.
After a “thorough analysis of the experimental data obtained during multiple communication sessions between Micius and one of the ground stations,” Miller found delays between the laser diodes on board, the biggest gap being about 300 ps (picoseconds).
“With such a mismatch in timing, a potential attacker using as perfect equipment as possible, unless it violates the laws of physics, was shown to be capable of distinguishing decoy states from signal ones in at least 98.7% of cases,” Miller said.
We’ve reached out to Miller asking for the full research, and will share more details with you when we get our hands on the document.
